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A REQUIEM FOR SAM’S BANK
RONALD J. MANN*

INTRODUCTION
Wal-Mart’s application to form a bank ignited controversy among
disparate groups, ranging from union backers to realtor’s groups to
charitable organizations.1 The dominant voice, though, was that of
independent bankers complaining that the big-box retailer would drive
them out of business. Wal-Mart denied any interest in competing with local
banks by opening branches,2 claiming that it was interested only in
payments processing. Distrusting Wal-Mart, the independent bankers urged
the FDIC to deny Wal-Mart’s request and lobbied state and federal
lawmakers to block Wal-Mart’s plans through legislation. Ultimately, WalMart withdrew its application, concluding that it stood little chance of
overcoming the opposition.
The controversy dovetails with a banking regulatory concern about the
existing system for supervising commercial firms that own non-traditional
banks. Wal-Mart sought to form an industrial loan company (“ILC”) under
Utah law,3 which it could do only if the FDIC approved its application for
deposit insurance.4 Under what many regard as a loophole in the existing
*
Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. I am grateful for input from presentations at the law schools
at the University of Michigan and Columbia, at the Payment Cards Center at the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia, and at the Conference on Rethinking Payment Law at the Federal Reserve Bank of
New York.
1. The FDIC received thousands of comments in response to Wal-Mart’s application for deposit
insurance and held the first formal public hearings ever on such an application. Wal-Mart’s application
as well as the public comments, written statements and hearing transcripts are available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/walmart/index.html.
2. A number of states nevertheless reacted by introducing bills to ban out-of-state industrial
banks from opening bank branches in their states, several of which appear to violate the Riegle Neal
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g), 1828(d)(4). See Letter from Julie Williams, Chief Counsel, OCC, et al., to
John “Buz” Gorman, General Counsel, Conference of State Bank Supervisors (July 28, 2006).
3. Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-3. Industrial loan companies were created a century ago to make loans
to workers but they have evolved in recent years as they gained limited powers to accept deposits and
make loans.
4. Without regard to any intent to accept deposits, Wal-Mart would need deposit insurance to
satisfy both its stated business objectives and the requirements of Utah law. Wal-Mart did plan to offer
certificates of deposit to charitable organizations and individual investors generated through deposit
brokers, but not demand deposits. See Application, supra note 1.
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statutory framework,5 Wal-Mart’s regulator would have been the FDIC,
and Wal-Mart’s primary responsibility to this entity would have been to
refrain from plundering its assets.6 By contrast, entities that own traditional
banks (“bank holding companies” or “financial holding companies”) are
subject to oversight by the Federal Reserve and to various “prompt
corrective action” rules that obligate the parent in times of distress to
provide aid to the banking subsidiary. In some cases the Federal Reserve
can force divestiture.7
Despite Wal-Mart’s ability to provide more than adequate capital for
an ILC, the FDIC responded first by freezing all deposit insurance
applications submitted from proposed ILCs first for six months (through
Jan. 2007), and then by freezing applications filed by non-financial entities
for another year (through Jan. 2008).8 The FDIC explained that it needed
more time to examine the impact of ILCs on the banking system.9 Federal
regulators are concerned about the ILC structure because the number and
size of the entities using the ILC loophole has mushroomed in the last few
years.10 Absent some action, the owners of an increasingly significant share
of institutions will become largely unsupervised.
At the same time, financial holding companies and thrift holding
companies (entities like CitiGroup and Merrill Lynch that own both deposit
institutions and other financial services companies) believe that Wal-Mart’s
5. The loophole appears in Section 101 of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987
(CEBA), which defined “bank” for purposes of the Bank Holding Company Act to exclude qualifying
ILCs, credit card banks (as defined in CEBA), and certain then-existing “nonbank” banks. Because this
entity would not be a “bank” for purposes of that statute, Wal-Mart could own it without being a bank
holding company. Among other things, the exemption requires the ILC to obtain deposit insurance from
the FDIC. 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(H). The statute also requires that the entity satisfy one of the three
following conditions: that it have not changed control since 1987, that it have less than $100 million in
assets, or that it not accept demand deposits. Utah law uses the term “industrial bank” to refer in Utah
Code Ann. § 7-8-3 to the Utah entity that qualifies for the federal ILC exception in Section
1841(c)(2)(H). To make matters confusing, Utah also recognizes a separate type of entity called an
“industrial loan company” (under Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-21), which does not qualify for the federal ILC
exception. Rather, that entity avoids bank status entirely under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(1)(B) because it is
not qualified to accept deposits. For simplicity, the text uses the common term “ILC” to refer to the
Utah industrial bank.
6. Federal Reserve Act §§ 23A, 23B, 12 U.S.C. §§ 371c, 371c-1.
7. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1843 (notice obligations), 1844 (reporting obligations), 1831o (capital
requirements); 12 CFR Part 325 (prompt corrective action rules).
8. For analysis of what the “non-financial” limitation means in this context, see Federal Reserve
System, Order Determining That Certain Activities Are Complementary to the Financial Activity of
Underwriting and Selling Health Insurance (Sept. 7, 2007).
9. See FDIC Press Release PR73-2006 (July 28, 2006) (announcing a 6-month moratorium on
ILC applications); FDIC Press Release PR7-2007 (Jan. 31, 2007) (12-month extension of the
moratorium).
10. The assets of ILCs have grown from $4 billion in 1987 to $140 billion as of 2005. U.S.
Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-621, Industrial Loan Corporations: Recent Asset Growth
and Commercial Interest Highlight Differences in Regulatory Authority (2005).
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ability to avoid intrusive oversight and supervision would give it an unfair
competitive advantage. Wal-Mart’s response is that the loophole has been
around for decades, and that there is no difference between Wal-Mart using
this loophole and companies like GM, BMW and General Electric that do
the same.11 Most pointedly, why should Target, a prominent competitor,
have access to this loophole while Wal-Mart does not?12 Given the large
share of Target’s corporate profits derived from its ILC and its credit card
bank,13 Wal-Mart’s question is a fair one.14
This article situates those debates in the context of payments policy.
Stepping away from banking policy per se, Wal-Mart’s plans should be
viewed in the historical context of the overlapping shifts in payment
systems that are happening in this country: from older payment systems
(cash and checks) that are public, paper-based, and universal, to newer
systems (predominantly credit and debit cards) that are private, electronic,
and networked.15 Thus, in 2004, for the first time, the value of retail
purchases made with credit and debit cards exceeded the value of retail
purchases made with checks.16
At the turn of this century, a new era of payments is beginning.
Despite the obvious benefits payment cards have brought to our

11. The prominent ILCs of non-financial entities have remarkably different missions. BMW uses
an ILC to issue a consumer credit card. Target and Volvo use use ILCs to issue payment and credit
cards for businesses. General Motors uses its industrial bank to provide car financing. GE’s ILC is a
diversified multinational financing entity. Most interesting of all, Volkswagen’s industrial bank
specializes in home equity lending.
12. Target uses its Utah ILC to issue its business credit card. It also has a CEBA credit card bank
(under 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)) for its consumer credit card operations.
13. About one quarter of Target’s 2005 earnings ($573 million out of $2.4 billion) came from its
credit card operations. Target 2005 10K at 24.
14. I note for the sake of completeness three similar organizational forms that would not suit WalMart’s purposes: a nonbank bank, a CEBA credit-card bank, and a Utah industrial loan company under
Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-21. Wal-Mart cannot form a nonbank bank because the loophole for those
entities was closed in 1987 – entities holding those banks are exempt from BHC status only if they
controlled the bank before 1987 and if the entity refrains both from making commercial loans and from
accepting demand deposits. The Federal Reserve previously had tried to treat the parents of those
entities as BHCs under Regulation Y, but the Supreme Court overturned the applicable regulation in
Board of Governors v. Dimension Financial Corp., 474 U.S. 361 (1986). A CEBA credit-card bank
(authorized by 12 U.S.C. § 1841(c)(2)(F)) might be useful for credit card operations, but would not be
useful if Wal-Mart wished to engage in other activities such as electronic check processing. Finally the
Utah industrial loan company under Utah Code Ann. § 7-8-21 would solve Wal-Mart’s BHC problem
(because the entity would not be a bank under the BHCA), but without deposit insurance it could not
get an account at the Federal Reserve. 12 U.S.C. §§ 342, 461(b)(1)(A). A bank without an account at
the Federal Reserve could not send or receive ACH transactions directly, a significant part of WalMart’s plan.
15. For a detailed discussion of those shifts, see Ronald J. Mann, Charging Ahead: The Growth
and Regulation of Payment Card Markets ch. 1 (2006).
16. See Nilson Report Issues 761, 823.
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economy,17 the maturation and market dominance18 of the private
networked electronic systems operated by Visa and MasterCard has had
two adverse effects. First, a diminished incentive to innovate has led to
stagnation in the development of less expensive payment systems. Second,
the network effects that pose a barrier to entry have allowed Visa and
MasterCard to deploy strategies designed to suit the interests of the banks
that control them, to the detriment of the merchants and cardholders that
use and accept the cards. The last decade has seen increased recognition by
merchants of the important link between payment systems and the
profitability of their operations. Wal-Mart’s application is but one of the
steps merchants and others are taking to undercut the effective control of
the payments systems that the large payment card networks have
established in the last half century. Seen from that perspective, a powerful
case can be made that granting Wal-Mart’s application would have had a
salutary effect on a market that has seen too little competition and
innovation for the last two decades.
Part 2 begins by discussing the payments markets in which Sam’s
Bank would have participated and the likely consequence of permitting its
entry into those markets. Part 3 analyzes the regulatory interests affected by
the creation of Sam’s Bank. Finally Part 4 discusses broader policy
concerns that weigh even more directly in favor of facilitating greater entry
to the payments industries. Finally, Part 5 proposes a new regulatory
framework for “payment services providers,” designed to facilitate the
entry of parties like Wal-Mart that would bring new strength to the
payments industries without engaging in activities that implicate the
traditional concerns associated with regulation of depository institutions.
II. WAL-MART AND PAYMENTS POLICY
The existing debate has not seriously analyzed how Wal-Mart’s stated
business objectives might affect the policy decision whether to permit WalMart to go forward. However much Wal-Mart might be able to operate a
profitable set of retail banks from its immense network of retail locations,19
17. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 3 (discussing cost savings from the use of cards
for payment and lending transactions).
18. Although the market in which the literally thousands of potential credit card issuers compete
against themselves is highly competitive, competition at the network level (with and between Visa and
MasterCard) is considerably less robust. As discussed below, there are several other electronic
payments networks, the PIN-based debit networks, the ACH network, and the developing Check 21
processing networks. In general, however, those networks are competing to draw volume from paperbased systems rather than competing against the credit card networks.
19. The skepticism about Wal-Mart’s proposal comes in part from Wal-Mart’s previous attempts
to acquire banks and in part from its current forays in to retail banking in places like Mexico and
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the reason Wal-Mart wanted a bank at this time was to lower the costs it
incurs in collecting payments from its customers. A bank would have given
Wal-Mart direct access not only to the systems for processing credit cards
and debit cards, but also to the increasingly important electronic systems
for check processing (automated clearinghouse or “ACH” networks).
Wal-Mart and Cost-Cutting
Wal-Mart’s desire to cut payment costs should not be surprising. WalMart is famous for pressing suppliers to lower their costs – steadily,
substantially, and repeatedly. But the costs of payment services for WalMart – the costs it pays to process checks and the fees it pays when it
accepts credit cards or debit cards – have not gone down substantially in
years. On the contrary, the price of those products – which are at their core
sophisticated information processing services – has remained stable as the
costs of information processing have fallen. There was a time when Visa
and MasterCard were leaders in the deployment of cutting-edge
information technology,20 but as their dominance in the marketplace has
grown, the incentives to increase the efficiency of their technology have
become less pressing.
To be sure, Wal-Mart has benefited in labor-cost savings and in speed
of checkout as customers have shifted from slower paper-based checking
systems to faster card-based payment systems.21 And the rise of electronic
check conversion lowers Wal-Mart’s payment acceptance costs
considerably, at least for the check writers that patronize its stores.22 But
the charges for the increasingly mainstream credit card products offered by
Visa and MasterCard remain stagnant. Thus, by comparison to the costs of
the other products their customers might use to make payments, the charges

Canada. See Steve Goldstein, Wal-Mart Gets Approval to Offer Banking in Mexico, N.Y. Times, Nov.
24, 2006; Hollie Shaw & Carrie Tait, Wal-Mart Eyes Banking, National Post, Oct. 31, 2006. It also is
relevant that Wal-Mart’s present plans would not bind the resulting ILC. Under applicable FDIC
regulations, Wal-Mart after only a few years would have been able to broaden the scope of its
operations considerably, though it would have needed the consent of the FDIC for major changes. See
12 CFR § 333.2.
20. See Dee Hock, Birth of the Chaordic Age ch. 12 (1999); Dee Hock, One from Many: VISA
and the Rise of Chaordic Organization ch. 12 (2005).
21. See Elizabeth Klee, Paper or Plastic? The Effect of Time on Check and Debit Card Use at
Grocery
Stores
(unpublished
November
2004
manuscript),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=687159 (empirical analysis indicating that check
transactions typically take about 30 seconds longer than payment card transactions).
22. Electronic check conversion converts a paper check at the point of sale to an ACH transaction
cleared through the NACHA network (a POP entry in NACHA’s terminology). Wal-Mart has been
among the market leaders in retail adoption of that technology. Stuck in a Rut, POP E-Checks Get a
Boost from Bentonville, Digitaltransactions.net (Sept. 13, 2006).
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that Wal-Mart pays when it accepts Visa and MasterCard products seem
increasingly out of line.23
Wal-Mart’s dissatisfaction with the credit card, in particular, is
exacerbated by competition with discount and dollar stores that often do
not accept credit cards at all. The costs of credit card acceptance are less
problematic for high-end retailers, which operate on high margins and
depend on the discretionary and impulsive spending that credit cards
facilitate.24 Wal-Mart’s traditional emphasis on low prices,25 by contrast,
leaves it with low margins against which a fixed payment cost that does not
decline over time has become increasingly conspicuous.
Cutting the Costs of Payments
The tension between the relatively stable costs of credit card
acceptance and Wal-Mart’s cost-cutting philosophy has long motivated
Wal-Mart to explore possible responses that would lower its costs. For
example, Wal-Mart was one of the lead plaintiffs in the successful “honor
all cards” litigation against Visa and MasterCard and has been a leader in
facilitating non-card payment systems at its Web site. Thus, properly
viewed, the application to form Sam’s Bank is the latest in a continuing
series of payments policy initiatives. To understand this particular
initiative, it is useful to explore exactly how it would lower payment costs.
Credit Cards
The conventional explanation assumes that Wal-Mart would form an
industrial loan company that would operate as an acquirer much like the
ILC subsidiary of First Data Corporation (the largest acquirer in the
country, with more than a 50% share of a market).26 But this would not
23. Although it is difficult to generalize because precise figures are proprietary, a merchant like
Wal-Mart on a $100 transaction probably pays about $1.80 if it accepts a credit card, $1.00 if it accepts
a Visa or MasterCard debit card, eighty cents if it accepts a check, fifty cents if it accepts a PIN-based
debit card, and twenty-five cents if it performs an electronic check conversion. Honor-all-cards policies
have made it difficult for merchants to limit the types of networked payment products that they accept,
while surcharge restrictions have made it difficult for merchants to affect consumer choice between and
among networked and universal payments. The result from the merchant’s perspective is that
consumers driven by advertising and rewards programs choose payment products unaffected by the
high marginal cost that the merchant pays to accept those products.
24. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, chs. 4, 12 (showing that consumers spend more
when they use payment cards than when they use paper-based payment products).
25. See Wal-Mart: The Face of Twenty-First-Century Capitalism 52-56 (Nelson Lichtenstein ed.
2006).
26. Visa and MasterCard require all entities that participate directly in their networks (either by
issuing cards or acquiring transactions) to be banks. Because ILCs qualify as banks without subjecting
their parents to federal BHC regulation, nonbank processing companies like First Data have used ILCs
to conduct their acquisition businesses. {First Data recently converted its Colorado ILC to a non-
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lower Wal-Mart’s net payment costs in any substantial amount. Let us
suppose that Wal-Mart is currently paying its acquirer (Chase Paymentech,
a joint venture including Chase and First Data) about 1.65% in merchant
fees on its Visa and MasterCard transactions (an excellent rate for a
merchant that is not a grocery store).27 If we substitute Sam’s Bank as the
acquirer, Wal-Mart would pay that 1.65% to its subsidiary instead of to
Chase Paymentech.
The problem, however, is that Sam’s Bank would have to forward
something in the range of 1.43% of those funds to Visa and MasterCard
(the interchange share) and would have to fund its payment processing
operations out of the remaining 0.22% of revenues. Because the business of
acquiring credit card transactions is competitive, the spread that acquirers
retain has been dropping substantially in recent years. As information
technology advances, it becomes cheaper to process payments, particularly
for the largest companies (First Data, Bank of America, and Nova). There
is little reason to think that Sam’s Bank could process its payments at a cost
that would leave it with any substantial profit – indeed there is good reason
to think that Sam’s Bank would lose money if it undertook to process
payments at the same price as Chase Paymentech. Even with Wal-Mart as a
client, Sam’s Bank would be a much smaller and less experienced acquirer
than First Data.28
If that were the whole story, then Wal-Mart in fact might lose money
if it inserted its subsidiary as the acquirer. That possibility suggests that
Wal-Mart’s plan is more complex. Perhaps, it also includes issuing Visa or
MasterCard credit cards to its customers, something Wal-Mart cannot do
industrial trust, to accommodate its pending takeover by KKR. See First Data Gets OK to Convert
Industrial Bank, DENV. BUS. J., July 19, 2007. Originally, all acquirers were banks, but in recent years,
the market has become dominated by technology companies that specialize in efficient processing. First
Data Corporation now processes about half of all general-purpose credit card transactions in the United
States. See Top U.S. Acquirers, Nilson Report, Issue 854, at 1, 7 (Apr. 2006). Although the market is
increasingly concentrated, the market for acquisition is competitive, in the sense that a large number of
acquirers compete for merchants based on the price that they charge. As of 2006, 90 acquirers
processed more than $1 million transactions per week.
27. The lowest credit card interchange rate for a non-supermarket merchant is 1.43% under the
current
rates
for
either
Visa
or
MasterCard,
available
at
http://usa.visa.com/download/business/accepting_visa/ops_risk_management/Interchange_Rate_Sheets
.pdf
and
at
http://www.mastercard.com/us/wce/PDF/14992_MasterCard_Interchange_Rates_and_Criteria__October_2006.pdf. If Wal-Mart pays 1.65% of the sales price to its acquirer and its acquirer (currently
Chase Paymentech) pays 1.43% of the sales price to the issuers, the acquirer receives only 0.22% of the
revenues to fund the costs of processing Wal-Mart’s transactions.
28. If anything, the pending acquisition of First Data by KKR suggests the possibility of an inflow
of capital likely to increase the aggressiveness of First Data’s operations. See Joe Bel Bruno, KKR
Continues Talks for First Data Loans, FORBES, Sept. 10, 2007 (discussing difficulties KKR faces in
obtaining financing for its acquisition of First Data).
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directly unless it owns a bank. Target, of course, has done this with great
success, with its earnings in recent years from its credit card unit growing
much more rapidly than earnings from retail sales.29 And this is an option
on which Wal-Mart would save even if it were not as skillful as Target at
lending to its customers. The key point would be that Sam’s Bank as issuer
would receive the interchange revenues, the roughly 1.4% of all sales that
the acquirer currently forwards through the Visa and MasterCard system.
Of course, Wal-Mart could try to accomplish the same thing by
offering its own store-branded card without opening a bank. But it has done
that already, most recently with a Discover product issued by GE
Consumer Finance. Historically, however, as Target’s experience shows, it
is much easier for a retailer to get a card to the “top of the wallet” if it is a
Visa or MasterCard product than if it is a store-branded card. If Wal-Mart’s
customers (like Target’s before them) used the store-branded card rarely,
then that strategy would not lower Wal-Mart’s payment costs substantially.
Thus, Wal-Mart’s plan likely includes not only acquiring card transactions
from its stores, but also becoming a Visa or MasterCard issuer.
Check Conversion
As the discussion above suggests, Wal-Mart also is interested in the
costs it incurs when it accepts payments from customers that do not use
credit cards.30 For example, given the demographics of Wal-Mart’s
customers, Wal-Mart presumably is one of the largest recipients of checks
among American merchants, and thus has the greatest incentive to lower
the costs of check processing.31 If Wal-Mart in its capacity as merchant can
save money by converting those paper checks to electronic checks at the
point of sale, it is natural to wonder if Wal-Mart could not save even more
money by eliminating the middleman and participating directly in the
processing of check conversion transactions. Those transactions already are
much cheaper for the retailer than checks or conventional credit and debit

29. Target’s credit card earnings grew from $420 million in 2004 (13% of total earnings) to $573
million in 2005 (23% of total earnings) to $693 million in 2006 (25% of total earnings, while its noncredit card earnings shrank from $2.758 billion in 2004 to $2.094 billion in 2006. See Target 2005 10K
at 24; Target 2006 10K.
30. Although the share of customers that pay with checks has fallen from 27% to 16% in the last 4
years alone, Wal-Mart will still receive more than 1 billion checks in 2007. The cost savings to WalMart of converting those checks to electronic transactions is significant. Wal-Mart Goes Chainwide
With POP In Bid To Cut Payment Costs, DigitalTransactionNews (Apr. 17, 2007).
31. Check use is increasingly concentrated among adult Americans without credit cards. Adult
Americans without credit cards are for the most part lower in income and wealth than those with credit
cards, and because Wal-Mart is a dominant retailer for that sector of our society, Wal-Mart presumably
has a higher share of customers that do not have credit cards than many other retailers.
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card products. Moreover, continuing developments of technology and
infrastructure are making the product even better suited for large retailers
like Wal-Mart with many checkout lanes at a single location.32 Still, they
have been slow to gain a major place in the consumer payments market.
Yet Wal-Mart is ideally suited to deploy them, with a large customer base
unusually likely to contain check writers. Thus, Wal-Mart well might
believe that it eventually could present and settle those items more cheaply
than existing financial institutions.33
Debit Cards
Similar reasoning applies to PIN-based debit card transactions, which
traditionally have been processed over regional networks like NYCE and
Pulse, rather than the international networks like Visa and MasterCard.
Again, because that market has faced less competition than the market for
acquiring Visa and MasterCard transactions, it is easier to see how WalMart could profit by cutting out a “middleman” bank from those
transactions. Wal-Mart has taken indirect steps to cut out that middleman
by its participation in Debitman (now Tempo).34 But Debitman has been
slow to penetrate the market.35 As with any new payment system, it is not
enough that one party (the merchant in this case) prefers the system; there
has to be some effective motivation to cause the consumer to use the
system as well. The difficulties Debitman has faced are the most
conspicuous evidence of the continuing power of the network effects
associated with the maturation of the Visa and MasterCard systems. In the
end, it should be no surprise that Wal-Mart’s application emphasizes its
intention to deploy its own debit cards.36
32. See Nadia Oehlsen, Check Conversion Moves to the Back Office, Cards & Payments, Dec.
2006, at 44; Christopher Westfall, The U.S. Payments System: Needing Consolidation, or Fine As Is?,
Banking Insider, Dec. 22, 2006.
33. If Wal-Mart has any interest in that product, it could not form a CEBA credit card bank under
the 1841(c)(2)(F) exception, because it would go beyond the “credit card operations” to which those
entities are limited.
34. Debitman is a debit card network in which customers obtain cards from retailers rather than
from their banks. The cards fund purchases through the ACH network, which is much less expensive
than the conventional debit card processing systems. NACHA presumably cooperates with Debitman
because the success of Debitman would shift transaction volume to the ACH network from the
traditional check-processing and PIN-based debit-card networks. A Debitman transaction costs a
participating retailer about fifteen cents, much less than the fifty cents that is the typical cost of a
conventional PIN-based debit card transaction. The transaction is even cheaper if the customer uses a
Debitman card issued by the retailer, because the retailer receives a rebate of about half of the fifteencent fee. See www.tempopay.com; Debitman Rebuilds and Targets Card Association, Cards Int’l, Issue
372, at 1 (Dec. 2006) [hereinafter Debitman Rebuilds].
35. See Debitman Rebuilds, supra note 34.
36. See Application, supra note 1, at 1.
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Internet Payments
Wal-Mart’s concerns have particular significance on the Internet,
where Visa and MasterCard traditionally have held an even more dominant
position than at retail. Credit cards dominated Internet retail when that
market first arose in the late 1990’s largely because traditional competitors
(checks and cash) were wholly impractical for remote electronic
purchases.37 But the failure of Visa and MasterCard to give adequate
attention to problems of fraud and data security has given merchants a
powerful incentive to search for new payment alternatives. And in the
Internet environment, where all interactions are electronic, products like
Bill Me Later and Google Checkout (both discussed in more detail below)
have spread much more rapidly than products like Debitman have spread in
the conventional retail environment.
Wal-Mart.com is a major force in Internet retail, with more than a
billion dollars in annual sales, one of the very largest operations outside the
office supply and electronics sectors.38 As discussed above, Wal-Mart
already has been a leader in supporting the use of electronic check
conversion at the retail counter. If Wal-Mart had a bank (and thus had
direct access to the networks over which those payments are processed),
there is every reason to think that it could accelerate the design and
deployment of non-card payment products on the Internet, breaking down
the dominant market power that Visa and MasterCard have in that sector.
III. BANK REGULATION
Although the preceding discussion suggests that consumers might
benefit if Wal-Mart had a bank, it provides no justification for exempting
Wal-Mart and its bank from appropriate banking regulations. On that point,
the United States has abandoned since the Great Depression the notion that
the market can be trusted to monitor the safety and soundness of banks.39
The problem is not simply that banks are large enterprises with substantial
assets. American car manufacturers, airlines, and steel companies all at one
time were large enterprises with assets far exceeding those of most banks.40
Yet those entities were never subject to the kind of pervasive ongoing
37. See Ronald J. Mann, Payment Systems and Other Financial Transactions 260-70 (3rd ed.
2005).
38. Internet Retailer, Top 500 Guide (2006).
39. Jonathan R. Macey et al., Banking Law and Regulation 80-92 (3rd ed. 2001).
40. That is particularly true in the United States, where populist concerns have kept most banks
relatively small. See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American
Corporate Finance (1994).
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bureaucratic supervision to which banks and their owners are regularly
subjected (and from which Wal-Mart is now and would continue to be
exempt). Some in recent years have argued that banks should be treated
like other large companies – with considerably less supervision and
regulation.41 But the idea that banks need no constraints will get little
policy traction as long as the crises of the 1980’s can be recalled. In this
context, two particular concerns are important: the separation of commerce
and banking, and the systemic harms from bank failure. Neither concern
would apply to an ILC limited to the provision of payment services.
Separating Commerce from Banking
Among other things, the systemic bank failures during the Depression
produced an abiding sense that banks should be separate from large
commercial enterprises.42 The importance of this concern in modern
banking regulation is difficult to gauge. For one thing, it is not clear that
this concern has ever been entirely sincere. It always has had the effect of
insulating financial institutions from competition by potentially more
nimble non-financial firms. And given the relatively small size of
American banks, it often (as in the case of Wal-Mart) excludes owners of
undoubted liquidity and soundness.43 It also is relevant that most of our
important trading partners (Japan and Germany being the most conspicuous
examples) have robust banking systems without any such separation.44 The
weakening of legal constraints on non-financial companies that came with
Gramm-Leach-Bliley surely reflects growing skepticism about the
importance of this problem.45 Yet, federal law still imposes considerable
restraints on financial holding companies, restraints that Wal-Mart wishes
to avoid.
Whatever their general weight, concerns about the confluence of
commerce and banking are ill-placed here. The principal argument against
confluence points to the likely concentration of financial assets and the

41. Peter Wallison, Why Do We Regulate Banks, Financial Services Outlook (AEI Online Aug. 1,
2005).
42. See Macey et al., supra note 39, at 22-24. The concern is not nearly as strong in Canada,
where a system of larger banks survived the Depression unscathed. See Duncan McDowall, Quick to
the Frontier: Canada’s Royal Bank (1993).
43. See Lawrence J. White, Should Wal-Mart, Real Estate Brokers, and Banks Be in Bed
Together? A Principles-Based Approach to the Issues of the Separation of Banking and Commerce,
NYU Center for Law and Economics Working Paper No. 07-23.
44. For a detailed discussion, see Bernard Shull, The Separation of Banking and Commerce in the
United States: An Examination of Principal Issues 24-33 (OCC Working Paper 99-1).
45. See Macey et al., supra note 39, at 464-67.
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corresponding potential for inequity in the lending markets.46 The idea is
that the commerce/banking conglomerate will have an advantage over the
purely commercial enterprise because it will provide financing to its related
commercial enterprises that will not be available to unrelated third-party
competitors. As the Senate Banking Committee said in a report on the
subject: “The separation of banking from commerce helps ensure that
banks allocate credit impartially, and without conflicts of interest. The
nonbank bank loophole * * * raises the risk that banks’ credit decisions will
be based not on economic merit but on the business strategies of their
corporate parents.”47 More generally, the distinction between commerce
and banking increasingly seems incoherent as applied to payments
providers, which increasingly are IT firms. The increasing importance of IT
as the core competency of these firms raises the natural question why First
Data should be treated differently from Microsoft or Google, or even from
Wal-Mart.
In sum, that rationale offers little reason to oppose Sam’s Bank, at
least in the form in which it was proposed, because Sam’s Bank would not
have been a commercial lender. Rather, it would have been a payments
processor. A payments processing enterprise need not involve the
aggregation of assets and lending power that poses a risk to the efficient
allocation of investment capital.
Systemic Effects of Bank Failure
The most obvious justification for the distinction between banks and
other large enterprises is that the failure of a bank that accepts deposits is
more likely to have a cascading effect than the failure of any other
corporate enterprise, even a large one. When a large corporate enterprise
fails, the resulting financial distress is borne primarily (though not entirely)
by that institution’s shareholders and its contract partners (creditors,
suppliers, employees, and the like). In the case of a depository institution,
however, there is a greater risk that the failure of the institution will have
ripple effects extending throughout the economy to the creditors of
creditors. This is particularly true when the bank that fails holds large
deposits from other banks. So, regulators traditionally have regarded large
banks as “too big to fail,” because of the likelihood that their failure would

46. See Macey et al., supra note 39, at 460-63.
47. See S. Rep. No. 100-19, at 8-10 (1987).
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bring down other banks, causing distress to the depositors of those banks
and more broadly through the economy.48
More recently, as the sophistication with which examiners study bank
operations has increased, regulators have given growing attention to the
likelihood that a bank’s financial arrangements are so intertwined with
those of other entities as to create a substantial risk of this kind of
cascading failure. Thus, we can see now, even relatively small institutions
could create serious problems if they are involved in activities that affect
other banks. In this literature, the risks rest not only on the size of deposits,
but also on large-scale payments processing.49
At first glance, the focus of Sam’s Bank seems to play directly into
this justification.50 But that view fails to account for the nature of the
payments that Sam’s Bank would handle and how those differ from the
large-dollar wholesale payments that create systemic payment risks. In
general, serious risks from payments processing are associated with the
“real-time gross value” settlement systems that are customary for wholesale
payment operations – in which each entity gives and receives full credit for
a transfer at the moment that it is made.51 In the United States, for example,
the Fedwire system transfers about $1.5 trillion each day, and provides
real-time value at the moment a transfer is made for each of those
payments. In that type of system, the possibility that a bank might be
unable to settle its position at the end of a business day raises a risk for
each institution to which the failed bank sent payments during the course of
the day. In the Fedwire system, the Federal Reserve banks mitigate that risk
by guaranteeing Fedwire payments through the course of each day.52
The payment operations of Sam’s Bank would present less risk. For
one thing, the individual daily obligations would be much smaller. The
Fedwire system commonly permits major banks to make payments during
the course of a single day that substantially exceed the capital of the
48. Gary H. Stern & Ron J. Feldman, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts (2004).
49. James R. Barth, Gerard Caprio & Ross Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels
Govern (2006).
50. Thus, a bipartisan group of congressmen, in a Mar. 10, 2006 letter to the FDIC, assert that
given the retailer’s “massive scope and international dealings,” its entry into the banking industry would
carry too many risks. For example, “a financial crisis within the company could damage the bank and
severely disrupt the flow of payments throughout the financial system.” Letter from Stephanie Tubbs
Jones et al. to Martin Gruenberg, Vice Chairman, FDIC (dated Mar. 10, 2006), available at
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/walmart/comment_letters_5/tubbs-jones.pdf.
51. It was the exposure of wire-transfer participants at the time of the 1974 failure of Germany’s
Herstatt bank that first made the systemic payments risk a common topic of policy concern. See Mann,
Payment Systems, supra note 37, at 239-40; see also Proposed Directive on Payment Services in the
Internal Market, (COM(2005)603), at 6 [hereinafter Payment Services Directive].
52. See Mann, Payment Systems, supra note 37, at 211-15.
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institution. The sums at stake in the consumer realm are not nearly so large.
Even for the largest participants in the credit card system, the daily sums
are much smaller than the institution’s capital base. JPMorgan Chase
cardholders, for example, spend about $1 billion per day, but the
institution’s net worth is in the range of $20 trillion.53 JPMorgan’s
solvency is unlikely to be substantially affected by daily fluctuations in the
inflow and outflow of payments that typically amount to a tiny fraction of a
percent of its market capitalization.
Moreover, the settlement systems for the small consumer payments
are designed to avoid the liquidity risks associated with wholesale funds
transfers. For example, payments made through the Visa and MasterCard
system are made through multilateral netting at the end of each day. Visa
and MasterCard use Fedwire to apply a single daily credit (or debit) to the
Federal Reserve account of each of their members that reflects the net
inflow or outflow of that member’s daily cards transactions. Similarly, the
electronic check payments that Sam’s Bank might clear through its Web
site would be processed in batches through the ACH network on a daily
basis, with net settlements that pose little if any systemic risk.54
If it seems technical to suggest that the details of the process of
settling payments can have such an important effect on the systemic risk
those payments raise, consider the following hypothetical. On a given day,
Bank of America acquires $100 million of credit card transactions on cards
issued half each by CitiBank and Chase, Citibank acquires $80 million of
transactions on cards issued half each by Bank of America and Chase, and
Chase acquires $60 million of transactions on cards issued half each by
Bank of America and CitiBank. In a gross settlement system, each of those
banks would pay to the others the entire sums that they owed. Bank of
America would send out $70 million ($40 to Citi and $30 to Chase). Citi
would send out $80 million ($50 to BoA and $30 to Chase). And Chase
would send out $90 million ($50 to BoA and $40 to Citi). In a system of
multilateral netting, the payments are much smaller. Bank of America
receives $30 million, Citi would make no payment at all, and Chase would
send out $30 million.
Because the total payments are so much larger in a gross system ($240
million as opposed to $30 in multilateral netting), it is crucial that
consumer payments processing involves multilateral netting rather than
53. See Card Volume at Merchants, Nilson Report, Issue 859, at 1, 9 (June 2006); JPMorgan
Chase 2005 10K.
54. See Benjamin Geva, The Law of Electronic Fund Transfers § 5.01 (discussing ACH
settlement process).
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gross settlements. Thus, even if an entity like Sam’s Bank were to fail, it is
unlikely that the amounts that it would owe to any particular institution
would undermine the solvency of that institution. Looking back to the
regulatory justifications discussed above, this suggests a relatively limited
systemic need for supervision of the operations of Sam’s Bank.
IV. THOUGHTS ON A BETTER WAY
As discussed above, the primary consideration should be the
possibility that Wal-Mart’s entry to the payments markets would drive
product innovation and cost-cutting that would benefit consumers either
directly or through diminution of the dominant market positions that Visa
and MasterCard currently hold. We seem to stand at a decisive point in the
history of the payments industry. Long dominated by cash and checks,
payment systems that were directly or indirectly supervised by the
government, the last thirty years have brought increasing dominance to the
private and largely unregulated payments networks built by Visa and
MasterCard. Those networks have contributed great value to the economy
by driving down the costs of payments and lending,55 but the fact remains
that they are operated for the private benefit of the banks that own them. At
the same time, Visa and MasterCard have retained for decades a dominant
market position, repelling repeated challenges from entities like American
Express, Discover, JCB, Diner’s Club, and Carte Blanche. It is easy to
understand the reasons for that dominance: network effects make it
extremely difficult for new entrants to gain a foothold in the provision of
payment systems.56 Because those effects underscore the strength of the
networks’ market dominance, the shift from public systems to a pair of
persistently dominant private systems is at least potentially troubling.57
Of course, one possibility is that the antitrust system will break down
the dominant positions of Visa and MasterCard – either through private
litigation or through actions brought by federal regulators. But given the
difficulties and complexities of an antitrust response, surely it is worth
considering a more market-oriented approach: fostering entry by
competitors. Entry by Wal-Mart well might present the incumbents with a
more serious challenge than they have faced in decades. Wal-Mart has a
network of almost 4000 locations in the United States, with tens of millions
55. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 3.
56. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, chs. 6-8 (attributing the unique dominance of
credit cards in United States markets to their earlier deployment here).
57. For discussion of the effects of the competitive power of the major networks, see Mann,
Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 11.
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of devoted customers. If Wal-Mart is as capable here as it has been in other
aspects of its business, pressure from Wal-Mart could drive considerable
improvement – some combination of new products or better prices.
The entry of Wal-Mart would be salutary not solely because of the
possibility that competitive pressure will reduce costs and drive innovation
in product design. By broadening the groups involved in the design and
deployment of products, it would broaden the range of pricing strategies.
To explain, the existing networks of Visa and MasterCard increasingly
depend on a strategy under which merchants will pay an interchange fee
that provides sufficient revenue to issuers to fund programs that foster
higher spending and borrowing by cardholders.58 That strategy has been
effective because network effects pose a barrier to new entrants that might
use different strategies and because even with a high interchange fee the
payment card system is in many contexts more attractive to merchants than
the paper-based systems it is replacing.
But systems designed by merchants or other industry players would
doubtless use a fundamentally different pricing strategy. The most obvious
approach is a system like Debitman, which can provide payment services
more cheaply because it avoids the costs of subsidizing the businessdevelopment programs issuers fund with interchange revenues. Similarly,
Bill Me Later is rapidly gaining attention, especially among airlines, but
also at mainstream sites like Walmart.com. Bill Me Later undercuts
standard credit-card interchange rates by avoiding the speedy approval and
settlement process of the credit-card networks.59 The neutral pricing
strategy of products like Debitman and Bill Me Later makes sense for
merchants that do not depend on the discretionary spending that the
aggressive rewards and teaser-rate strategies of Visa and MasterCard
motivate.
More intriguing are the recent developments that presage a world of
below-marginal-cost pricing of payments services, as payments themselves
are used to subsidize other business activities. The leader here is Google
Checkout, which can undercut standard credit-card interchange fees
because it uses the payments business as a way to attract advertisers.60
58. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 13; Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and
the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 Ill. L. Rev. 375.
59. See Peter Burrows, Big Plastic’s Online Challenger, Business Week, Dec. 30, 2005; Jennifer
LeClaire, Online Merchants Choosing Alternative Payment Options, E-Commerce Times, Dec. 21,
2005.
60. See Miguel Helft, Google Steps More Boldly into PayPal’s Territory, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20,
2006, at C1. PayPal pioneered a simpler strategy. It offers payment services to merchants at a blended
price that undercuts the credit card networks because some PayPal purchasers fund their purchases
through cheaper ACH transactions. Visa and MasterCard initially contested PayPal’s right to process
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The pricing strategies that Wal-Mart has used for its other financial
products strongly suggest that Sam’s Bank could subsidize payments costs
in a similar way. The financial services that Wal-Mart already offers are
priced very competitively. For example, in the 45 states in which it cashes
checks, Wal-Mart charges a flat $3 fee, compared to charges from $6 to
$15 for other check cashers. Apparently Wal-Mart’s prices for money
orders and wire transfers are very low as well.61 As discussed above,
owning a bank would allow Wal-Mart to broaden its product lines, bringing
lower prices to more niches of the consumer financial services market. In
an era when we are concerned about the ability of traditional financial
institutions to design products that can be priced attractively for lowerincome individuals, the entry of Wal-Mart bodes well.
This is not to say that there are no concerns about what Wal-Mart
might do with its bank. Let us suppose (as seems likely) that Wal-Mart
prices check cashing so low because the people for whom it cashes checks
will spend their money in Wal-Mart’s adjacent stores, and that it will use
the same strategy with new products and services it can deploy through
Sam’s Bank. Should that cross-subsidization of consumptive activity
trouble us? My inclination is to view that problem as minor. It may be that
Wal-Mart can use this tactic to boost sales in its stores, and it may be that
these kinds of bundling techniques can be used to entice consumers into
dubious consumption decisions. But given the product lines and brands
available at Wal-Mart’s typical stores – not exactly focused on indulgence
and luxury – this problem does not seem serious.
Another area of concern relates to the credit card product in particular.
If Wal-Mart plans to issue a general-purpose credit card, should we be
concerned because of the historical example of Target, where the profits
from the credit card soon may dwarf the profits that flow directly from
retail operations?62 As I demonstrate elsewhere, there are significant
relations between credit card spending, overall debt and bankruptcy, so a
strategy designed to increase the effectiveness of card marketing to WalMart customers would raise a serious concern.63 Again, the countervailing
factor is the likelihood that Wal-Mart would not focus on the profitability
transactions for third-party sellers, but ultimately backed off because PayPal’s use of the card networks
increased overall transaction volumes. See Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment
Intermediaries, 82 Texas L. Rev. 681 (2004). Even now, it is not clear that PayPal ever will be a threat
to Visa and MasterCard’s market position on the Internet.
61. Supercentre Banking: Wal-Mart and Financial Services, The Economist, Sept. 3, 2005
(discussing Wal-Mart’s competitive prices for money orders, wire transfers, check cashing services, and
express bill payments).
62. See supra note 29.
63. See Mann, Charging Ahead, supra note 15, ch. 5.
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of credit card issuance per se, but instead on lowering the costs of retail
payments as a way to foster profits from retail sales. Indeed, the
longstanding hostility of Wal-Mart to Visa and MasterCard suggests that it
is much more likely that Wal-Mart will focus on making payment products
cheaper (something at which it excels) and much less likely that it will
focus on maximizing interest and fee-based revenue streams (something
repugnant to its competitive culture, at which it has little or no experience).
V. A NEW APPROACH
The preceding discussion underscores both a mismatch between the
existing regulatory framework and the risks that Sam’s Bank actually
would pose and an increasingly arbitrary distinction between financial and
non-financial owners of payment service providers. This suggests value in
a new approach that would address payment processing risk in a uniform
and coherent way. The EU’s proposed Payment Services Directive
provides a useful model. Indeed, because the market position of the credit
card networks is much stronger here than it is in the EU, there is an even
greater reason to design a regulatory framework that would encourage
competition.64
The first step is to identify the best regulator and the appropriate
population of regulated entities. Because the concern is the risk of payment
processing, all entities that have access to the clearing and settlement
systems should be included, and the status of their owners as financial
entities should be irrelevant. The Federal Reserve Board’s position at the
center of the major clearing and settlement systems makes it the obvious
choice as regulator.
The second step is to decide what type of monitoring and supervision
is required. Because these institutions would neither take deposits nor
engage in commercial or consumer lending,65 the level of supervision
should be considerably less than for traditional depository institutions. The
principal regulatory activity should be to ensure the maintenance of a level
of liquidity commensurate with the types of payment operations in which
the entities engage. The emphasis should be on liquidity rather than capital,
64. The sanguine competitive position in the EU might change if the implementation of SEPA (the
Single Euro Payments Area) leads to continent-wide dominance for Visa and MasterCard. See, e.g., EU
Warns Cards Market over SEPA, Cards Int’l, Issue 371, at 1 (22 Nov. 2006); ECB Concerned About
SEPA Duopoly, Cards Int’l, Issue 372, at 17 (6 Dec. 2006).
65. The purpose of this framework is to permit access to payment systems for entities that have no
need to engage in banking. To the extent the owners of these entities are involved in other financerelated businesses like credit-card lending or other types of consumer finance, those activities would
remain subject to appropriate scrutiny under other frameworks.
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because the concern is whether the entity will be able to settle its
transactions on a daily basis, not whether it has the long-term financial
strength measured by capital accounts.
Entities, like Sam’s Bank, that limit themselves to net-settlement
consumer systems would require relatively low levels of liquidity. Entities
that seek access to riskier real-time gross settlement systems would be held
to higher levels. As compared to current regulatory frameworks, this has
the advantage that the Federal Reserve would be charged with directly
monitoring and assessing the appropriate levels of liquidity for those
entities most likely to disrupt the steady flow of payments on which our
economy increasingly depends. Indeed, given the importance of this
activity it is startling that the Federal Reserve’s current mandate on these
questions is so indirect.
My proposal does not directly address the propriety of retaining the
rules that exempt ILCs from the supervision required of other entities that
control financial institutions. Level-playing-field concerns, however, do
suggest that the other entities that currently use the ILC framework for
payments operations should be forced into the payment service provider
category. The existing regulatory framework involves a serious mismatch
between the activities of those entities – pervasive involvement in
payments – and the regulatory purposes—attending to deposit protection
for entities that receive few deposits. Resolution of that mismatch is at the
heart of my proposal, even without expressing any opinion on the care with
which the FDIC currently supervises those entities.
CONCLUSION
The focus of this symposium is on the proper level of uniformity in
the legal rules that govern payment systems. My submission identifies a
threshold problem, the lack of competition and barriers to entry in the
markets for payment services providers. My thesis is that a revision of the
regulatory framework designed to foster competition and lower barriers to
entry is a valuable part of an effort to design coherent rules. Greater
competition should foster innovation in payment systems development,
with more rapid convergence on the systems that respond most effectively
to the needs of commerce. At the same time, we might have more
confidence that rules developed in competitive markets provide satisfactory
answers to problems with unauthorized transactions, error, and the like.

